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Abstract
This paper analyzes fiscal competition among numerous spatially-
separated jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework. The
degree of factor mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because
it is costly and time-consuming to adjust factor stocks. Even if it is
harmful in the long run, a jurisdiction's residents can benefit in the
short run from taxing mobile factors owned by non-residents. The
optimal tax on mobile factors is lower, the faster the speed with
which factors adjust to fiscal policy. Anticipated taxes are less
beneficial than those that can be imposed unexpectedly.
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The now-large literature on scal competition has drawn considerable attention
to the importance of factor mobility for the analysis of tax and expenditure
policy. Although a wide variety of specic results can emerge under dierent
assumptions, it is well-established that factor mobility can have major conse-
quences for the optimal structure of local taxation and expenditures, for the
eciency and distributional impact of the scal policies chosen by a decentral-
ized system of jurisdictions, for the sharing of risk through public and private
institutions, and numerous other policy issues. As an example, one important
general lesson that emerges from this literature is that the capacity of local
governments to redistribute income is constrained by the mobility of factors of
production. The exposure of local governments to external markets means that
tax, transfer, and other redistributive policies involving mobile factors of pro-
duction are ineective because the net returns to these factors are determined
in markets whose geographical scope extend beyond that of any single locality.1
Many if not all of the early contributions to this literature make specic
reference to local governments in the US, units of government that are quite
numerous (there are some 80,000 units of local government in the US), typically
rather small in population, and almost all quite small in geographic scope, not
only with reference to the entire country but in relation to the states in which
they are located and even in relation to individual metropolitan areas.2 In the
context of the US and other federations, it is customarily argued that the task
of redistribution { one of Musgrave's three key functions of the public sector {
should rest in the hands of the national government. This argument rests pre-
cisely on the view that the redistributive capacity of subnational governments,
which are presumed to be relatively open to factor mobility, is more limited
than that of national governments, which are presumed to be relatively closed
to factor movements.3 And, indeed, redistribution is in fact undertaken, and on
historically very large scales, by national governments in OECD countries. Pub-
lic expenditures in the OECD countries of Western Europe and North America
countries in no cases fall short of 35% of GDP and not infrequently exceed 50%,
and these high levels of spending are mainly directed toward cash or in-kind
redistributive and social-insurance policies. The redistributive policies of sub-
national governments are far smaller in scale, plausibly because of the \more
competitive" environment within which these governments operate.
1This literature builds on such antecedents as Tiebout(1956), Stigler (1957), and Oates
(1972), studies of property tax incidence by such authors as Mieszkowski (1972) and Bradford
(1978), and subsequent development of similar models by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986),
Wilson (1986), and many others. For surveys of much of this literature, see Wilson (1999),
Oates (1999), and Wellisch (2000). See Cremer et al. (1996) and Wildasin (1998) for surveys
that focus on redistributive policy.
2For example, large SMSAs typically contain one or two large municipalities and many {
often well over 100 { relatively small municipalities, towns, or other units of local government.
3For classic statements of this view, see Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959, 1971), and Oates
(1972). This view is quite consistent, of course, with the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition in inter-
national economics, which views factors of production as completely immobile at the interna-
tional level and freely mobile within countries.
1Nevertheless, the lessons and analytical models developed in the literature
on scal competition are applied with increasing frequency at the international
level, in which the jurisdictional units of analysis are nations rather than local
governments. In particular, there have been numerous analyses of the implica-
tions of European economic integration that draw upon formal models originally
developed in the context of local public nance.4 This may be justiable if na-
tional factor markets are not as isolated as they once were. Certainly the volume
of international capital movements and international migration have increased
substantially in recent decades. To the extent that factors of production may
be mobile among nations as well as among small units of local government, the
lessons drawn from analyses of scal competition, at a fundamental level, must
be similar at whatever geographical scale they are applied. However, one might
be rather uneasy about drawing exact parallels between the implications of fac-
tor mobility for local governments in the US and other countries, on the one
hand, and entire nations on the other. Even if scal competition does exist at
the international level, it seems questionable whether it is \as intense" as the
competition that might be found among subnational governments.
Common sense would seem to suggest that the degree of factor mobility at
any given geographic scale, and thus the degree of scal competition at any
given level of jurisdictional size, is a \matter of degree", an \empirical ques-
tion" that cannot be resolved on an a priori basis. Factor mobility and the
forces of scal competition may well be operative at all levels of government,
regardless of geographical size, but \more so" at lower levels of government, i.e.,
for jurisdictions of smaller geographical size, than for higher levels. But what,
exactly, are the proper empirical questions to ask? What parameters should
be estimated? And, once they are estimated, how are they to be utilized to
determine the \degree" of scal competition?
No doubt there are many ways that these questions might be answered. The
present paper addresses them by exploring the notion that scal competition
across space depends on the (actual or potential) movement of factors of pro-
duction, a process that requires time. In any given jurisdiction, there is at any
moment a stock of factors of production, some of which, like natural resources,
are intrinsically immobile, but many of which, like labor and capital, are poten-
tially mobile. These stocks produce a ow of factor services which are rewarded
in local factor markets, thereby generating ows of income. Government redis-
tributive policies intervene in this income-generation process and thus create a
divergence between gross and net factor incomes. This may give rise to incen-
tives for factors to ow in or out of a given jurisdiction and for the stock of
factors thus to adjust to scal interventions. But this stock-adjustment process
does not occur instantaneously.
Consider the adjustment of labor resources rst. In some cases, labor can
4See, for example, Sinn (1997), Fuest and Huber (1999), Sorensen (forthcoming) and
Wildasin (forthcoming). (The last of these, which contains a more extensive discussion of
international factor movements and their implications in the European context, should be
viewed as a companion to the present paper.) Interest in scal competition at the interna-
tional level is not conned to academic discussions; see, e.g., OECD (1998), Dwyer (2000).
2be redeployed from one place to another almost immediately, especially when
physical distances are small (in the extreme case, moving workers from one task
to another within a given factory or store) or when the benets of relocation
are suciently great to warrant high-speed (and often high-cost) transportation
(e.g., using the corporate jet to assemble managers at headquarters for urgent
consultations). The spatial reallocation of labor is more rapid and less costly
when it does not entail changes in employment relationships. Spatial realloca-
tion of labor of this type occurs with such frequency and rapidity that it is often
not recorded statistically and certainly is not considered to be \migration" as
that term is generally understood and used for statistical purposes. On the
other hand, it often takes a signicant amount of time for workers to change
jobs, a process that may entail many forms of search, acquisition of new skills,
and other costly and time-consuming activities; it may also necessitate reloca-
tion of families, changing schools, adjustment to a dierent social environment,
or learning a new language. Perhaps the slowest adjustments are those that
involve massive relocations of labor over long distances, such as the migration
of labor from the Old World to the New, a process that was initiated centuries
ago and that continues to the present day, though at rates that have varied over
time. In between the extremes of reallocation of labor in dierent parts of the
same business establishment and international migration over long distances lies
a spectrum encompassing intermediate cases such as the reallocation of labor
within a given municipality, among municipalities within a given metropolitan
area, among states or provinces, or among larger regions. It is important to
note that the time required for reallocation of labor over space is endogenous:
such reallocations can ordinarily be accelerated, but it is costly to do so, both in
pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms. Thus, the speed of adjustment in general
depends on the reward to rapid adjustment in relation to its cost.
The situation with respect to capital movements is quite analogous. Some
forms of capital { such as nancial capital { can move extremely rapidly and at
very low cost. Other forms of capital movement { for example, the buildup of an
entire urban area as another urban area declines { generally proceed at a much
slower pace. To some extent, the speed of adjustment depends on the durability
of capital, which of course varies from one type of capital to another. It also
depends on the speed with which new investment plans can be formulated and
implemented, a process that in some cases is quite straightforward and imme-
diate but that in other cases entails the harnessing of technology in novel ways
and even the development entirely new industries. In general, as with labor,
the speed with which capital ows from one location to another is likely to be
slower, the larger the distances involved. For example, while it may be relatively
easy for a retailer to open additional retail outlets within a given state or coun-
try, expansion into international markets may be considerably more involved
and can ordinarily be expected to occur at a slower speed { though, as with
labor, the rate of adjustment of the capital stock is endogenously determined
and depends on the incentives facing capital owners.
In the light of these considerations, it appears that empirical questions con-
cerning the degree of factor mobility facing jurisdictions of dierent sizes and
3types can fruitfully be explored by analyzing the process of dynamic adjustment
of the stocks of (potentially) mobile resources. In turn, this should provide a
useful basis for the assessment of the importance and impact of scal competi-
tion at dierent levels of government.
The goal of the present essay is to develop an analysis of scal competition
in a simple but explicitly dynamic framework.5 The analysis builds on standard
models of costly dynamic adjustment that have been heavily exploited in empir-
ical models of investment. One advantage of this approach is that the analysis
thereby lends itself to empirical application; it also helps to suggest what fur-
ther kinds of empirical analysis would be particularly likely to contribute to
enhanced understanding of important issues of scal policy. Furthermore, the
dynamic analysis presented here establishes a transparent linkage with { in fact
is a directly generalization of { the static (or, perhaps better, atemporal) mod-
els that have been commonly employed in the literature. This helps greatly in
leveraging the insights derived from previous literature to achieve economically-
meaningful interpretations of results obtained in the inevitably somewhat more
complex dynamic analysis.
The next section of the paper begins by recalling a now-familiar static model
of scal competition, providing a reference point and establishing some notation
useful in the dynamic analysis. The basic dynamic framework is also introduced
in Section 2; it parallels the static model as far as possible in order to preserve
comparability with it. Section 3 solves for the comparative-dynamic response
of a small and open economy to permanent and unanticipated perturbations
of scal policy. It then utilizes these comparative-dynamic results to determine
the eects of scal policy on the (intertemporal) welfare of local residents and to
derive a characterization of the scal policy that is optimal from their viewpoint.
These results bear a close resemblance to those obtained in the static model, but
depart from them in ways that reect the fact that factor supplies do not adjust
instantaneously, instead adjusting gradually over time. Section 4 explores what
happens when local policies do not take economic agents by surprise but are, at
least to some degree, anticipated by them. This analysis amounts, technically
speaking, to a generalization of the case of unanticipated policy changes, and
the results dier from those of the preceding case in ways that can be easily
interpreted in relation to them. Section 5 oers some conclusions and discusses
5There have of course been previous studies that have examined various aspects of in-
tertemporal scal competition. For example, Jensen and Toma (1991) develop a two-period
model of tax competition in which a pair of governments use debt policy to manipulate the
intertemporal structure of taxation. Dynamic models of scal competition with imperfectly
mobile households are discussed by Hercowitz and Pines (1991) and Wildasin and Wilson
(1996). Perhaps closest in spirit to the present analysis is Lee(1997), who examines a two-
period model in which capital in the second period is imperfectly mobile. Lee shows that the
limited mobility in the second period can lead to higher than optimal levels of taxation and
spending. Like Jensen and Toma and Hercowitz and Pines, Lee's results reect the fact that
the jurisdictions being analyzed are large and thus interact strategically. It is not uncommon
for game-theoretic models of strategic scal competition to be formulated as \stage games"
with sequential decision structures e.g., Walz and Wellisch (1996), though these typically focus
on the determination of a single equilibrium constellation of private and public choices rather
than on the evolution of these choices over time.
4directions for future research.
2 The Model
2.1 A Static Benchmark
For purposes of comparison, it is valuable to restate the \canonical" model of
capital tax competition, using it to both to introduce some notation and to state
results that can then be compared to those obtained in the dynamic model.
The focus of attention throughout the entire is a single small jurisdiction, in-
habited by identical immobile households who can be treated as a representative
agent. This agent derives utility from consumption of private and public goods.
The former are treated as a single homogeneous commodity, as is valid, for ex-
ample, if all private consumption goods are traded on external markets at prices
that are independent of policy choices made within the jurisdiction and that can
therefore be taken as exogenously xed. This homogeneous good is taken as a
nume raire. The representative household supplies a xed amount of labor (and
possibly other xed, locally-owned, immobile resources that can be combined
with labor into a single aggregate xed factor). This input is used, along with
capital, in a perfectly-competitive local production sector using a technology
described by the production function f(k) with f0(k) > 0 > f00(k), where k is
the amount of capital used in the local production process. The gross returns to
capital and labor are given by f0(k) and w  f(k) kf0(k), respectively. Capital
is traded on the external market where it earns a net rate of return of r, treated
as exogenously xed from the viewpoint of this single small jurisdiction.6 It is
assumed that capital is freely mobile between the jurisdiction and the external
market, so that capital employed locally must earn the same net rate of return
as is available elsewhere. The locality is assumed to impose a source-based tax
on capital or capital income; for notational convenience, assume that the tax is
levied at a rate of  per unit of capital.7
The equilibrium condition that determines the level of capital in the locality
6By assuming a small jurisdiction, all elements of strategic scal competition are sup-
pressed. Strategic issues have been widely discussed in the literature and an obviously im-
portant topic for future research is to incorporate strategic behavior in an explicitly dynamic
framework like that presented below.
7Source-based taxes are those collected where capital is employed, as opposed to residence-
based taxes, which are collected where capital owners reside. Local property taxes, corporation
income taxes, and local cash or in-kind investment subsidies are examples of source-based scal
instruments (subsidies being treated as negative taxes). The taxation of interest, dividend,
and capital gains income under a personal income tax is an example of a residence-based tax.
The application of a source-based instruments is contingent on the jurisdiction in which the
capital is located, and hence these instruments may aect the spatial allocation of capital. The
application of a residence-based scal instrument is contingent on the jurisdiction in which
the capital owner is located, and hence these instruments may aect the spatial allocation of
capital owners. Both types of scal instruments are important in practice. While these taxes
(both source and residence-based) are often assessed on an ad valorem basis, the notation is
slightly easier for per-unit taxes and the analysis is substantively the same.
5is thus
f0(k)    = r; (1)







f0 < 0 (2)
where  = (dlnf0=dlnk) 1 is the elasticity of demand for capital in the locality.8
Note that =f0 is the tax rate expressed as a percentage of the before-tax rate
of return on capital. Note also that  is not restricted as to sign; in particular,
 should be interpreted as the scal burden on local capital, net of all subsidies
and net of the monetized equivalent of in-kind benets to capital such as local
public infrastructure and other local public services that raise the local return
on investment. The revenues collected from the local source-based capital tax
amount to k, and may be used either to nance local public goods or to reduce
the tax burden on local residents. Letting G denote the level of expenditure on
local public goods and letting T denote (net) taxes collected from local residents,
the government budget constraint is
G = T + k: (3)
In order to focus attention on the implications of capital mobility for the local
tax structure, it is assumed that the level of spending on and provision of local
public goods is exogenously xed. Furthermore, in order to suppress complica-
tions arising from the distortion of labor-leisure tradeos and other well-known
(and thoroughly-studied) incentive eects of taxes, it is assumed that the taxes
collected from (or subsidies paid to) local residents are lump-sum in nature.
It is assumed that local residents derive utility from consumption of private
and local public goods. Since the latter are exogenously xed in supply, however,
the welfare of local residents varies only with the former. The private good
consumption of local residents is equal to their net income from supplying labor
plus the return to any capital with which they may be endowed, denoted by  k,
i.e.,
Y = w   T + r k = f(k)   kf0(k) + k   G + r k (4)
where the second equality follows by substituting from the government budget
constraint (3).










8For example, if the local production technology is of the Cobb-Douglas form, f(k) = Ak,
with 0 <  < 1, then  = 1=(   1).
6where the second equality follows from (2). This equation provides the key
nding for the analysis of scal competition in the static case. Since (5) implies
that  is of the opposite sign from dY=d, it follows that the welfare of local
residents is enhanced by reducing the net scal burden on (or the net scal
transfer to) capital, if it is initially non-zero, and that local welfare is maximized
when local scal policy is structured in such a way that the net scal burden
on local capital is equal to zero.
2.2 A Framework for Dynamic Analysis
The conventional theory of demand for factor services relates the productiv-
ity of factors to their prices. As in the preceding subsection, this approach,
when applied to capital, yields a theory of the desired capital stock. Invest-
ment, however, is a ow that allows capital users to adjust this stock. Thus,
a long tradition in investment analysis focuses on the dynamic adjustment of
capital stocks. The rst task in such an approach is to explain why capital stock
adjustments are not instantaneous, i.e., why investment does not occur in ex-
tremely brief bursts in response to changing economic conditions. Authors such
as Gould (1968) and Treadway (1969) postulate the existence of adjustment
costs to explain ongoing ows of investment. Subsequent literature has drawn
attention to numerous interesting issues concerning the specication of adjust-
ment cost technologies, especially at the very disaggregated level of investment
in particular capital goods for particular plants. 9 The traditional approach,
however, is to suppose that the cost of altering the capital stock is an increasing
and convex function of the rate of investment, a specication that gives rise to
continuous ows of investment that result in gradual capital stock adjustment.
This traditional approach, which is followed here, has considerable appeal when
applied at the level of a jurisdiction that contains numerous rms in numerous
industries.
Thus, focusing as before on a single small jurisdiction that faces an external-
ly-given net rate of return on capital of r, let f(kt) be an increasing and con-
cave function representing the ow of output at time t as a function of the
capital stock kt and, implicitly, labor, land, and other resources that are im-
mobile and xed in supply. The gross return to these xed factors, denoted
by wt = f(kt)   ktf00(kt), is assumed as before to accrue to a representative
local consumer. This representative consumer is immobile and, in order to ob-
viate any issues relating to intergenerational transfers, to be innitely-lived (or,
equivalently, successive generations are linked through altruistically-motivated
intergenerational transfers).
The dynamics of the model are determined largely by adjustment costs that
rms must bear when they undertake local investment; in particular, these costs
will preclude instantaneous adjustment of the local capital stock. Specically,
the adjustment costs incurred by local rms are given by c(it)kt, with c0 > 0 <
c00, where it is the rate of gross investment within the locality at time t, i.e.,
9See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and references therein.
7the amount of expenditures on capital goods expressed as a proportion of the
amount of capital in the locality, kt. This adjustment cost is assumed to take
the form of lost output and is thus expressed in units of num eraire. Note that
since c() is homogeneous of degree zero in the level of investment and the total
stock of capital, total adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree one in these
variables. Assuming that capital depreciates at a constant exponential rate of
, the evolution of the local capital stock takes the usual form:
_ k = (it   )kt: (6)
The local government imposes a per-unit tax on capital at a rate  which for
now is assumed to be time-invariant. The cash ow of local rms at time t is thus
the value of their output net of adjustment costs, less investment expenditures,
less tax payments, less payments for local labor:
t = f(kt)   c(it)kt   kt   itkt   wt: (7)
Assume that no agents face liquidity constraints or other capital market
imperfections and that all agents plan over innite horizons. Local residents
derive utility from consumption of private and public goods, and are assumed
to plan their lifetime private consumption streams subject to the constraint
that the present value of lifetime consumption is equal to the present value of
lifetime income net of any taxes or transfers.10 Under these conditions, rms
are naturally assumed to maximize the present value of prots net of taxes or






subject to (6), with an initially-given stock of capital k0 = K0.
In addition to collecting revenues from the taxation of local capital, the local
government may collect revenue from or provide subsidies to local residents in a
lump-sum fashion and it can spend money on the provision of public goods that
benet local residents. Let T now denote the present value of lump-sum taxes
imposed on local residents; under the assumptions of the model, the precise time
path of revenue ows from these taxes is unimportant. Assume that the level of
provision of public goods is exogenously xed and let G now denote the present
value of public expenditures on public good provision; again, provided that
10The assumption that the economy of the jurisdiction is small relative to the world capital
market and that there are no capital market imperfections plays a crucial role in simplifying
the analysis. Much of the literature on taxation in a dynamic context assumes, by contrast,
that the economy is closed or, at least, that assets on external capital markets are only
imperfectly substitutable for domestic assets. In such models, policies that aect domestic
rates of savings or investment inuence the rate of interest and the path of intertemporal
consumption. Such considerations are obviated, and the analysis is thereby very substantially
simplied, under the assumptions maintained here { and, implicitly, perhaps, in the standard
atemporal models of scal competition.
8public good provision levels are xed, it is unnecessary for analytical purposes
to be explicit about their time path. Since the stock of capital in the locality
can vary over time, the amount of tax revenue collected from capital taxation
can also vary, with kt the amount of revenue collected at time t. The local
government budget constraint requires that




As noted, local residents derive utility from private consumption and from
local public goods, but since the latter are treated as exogenously xed they
can be ignored in the remainder of the analysis. In particular, no restrictions
are placed on the role of public goods in the preference structure of households.
The preferences of households over private consumption streams can also be very
general; essentially all that is required is that household intertemporal utility
maximization exhausts the present-value lifetime budget constraint. This basic
assumption implies that the welfare of local residents is an increasing function of
lifetime wealth. As already noted, households are endowed with xed supplies
of labor, earning a gross return of wt in every period. Local residents may also
be endowed with some stock of capital  k which earns a ow return of r k in
every period, as well as some ownership shares in local and foreign rms. Let
 represent the local ownership share in local rms, with 0    1, and let  
represent the present value of prots derived from ownership of rms outside
of the locality (that is, the product of the share of foreign rms owned by local
residents and the total prots of those rms). Under these assumptions, the












where the second equation follows by substitution from (30). Under the as-
sumptions of the model, local tax policy aects the welfare of local residents
only insofar as it aects Y . In particular, one can ask whether a change in
the rate of capital taxation, starting from any initial level, would increase or
decrease Y and thus the level of welfare of local residents. As in the static
model, to answer this question one must rst determine how the level of capital
in the local economy depends on the local tax rate. Since the capital stock ad-
justs gradually over time to a change in , the entire dynamic path of the capital
stock changes when tax policy changes, an adjustment that is considerably more
complex than the static response described in (2).
93 Comparative Dynamics: Time-Invariant Lo-
cal Tax Policy
The present section investigates the eects of time-invariant local policies. The
rst task is to understand how a once-and-for-all unanticipated and permanent
change in the local tax on capital aects the evolution of the local capital stock.
This will be studied under the assumption that the local economy is initially
in a long-run equilibrium. It will then be possible to determine how the local
tax policy aects local welfare. Issues relating to time-varying and anticipated
policy changes are deferred until the next section.
3.1 Fundamental Analytics
To understand the linkage between local tax policy and the local capital stock,
it is necessary to analyze the behavior of rms in greater detail. Specically,
forming the current-value Hamiltonian
Ht  t + t(it   )kt;




= 0 $ t = 1 + c0(it) (8)
 _  + rt =
@H
@kt
$  _  = f0(kt)   c(it) + (t   1)it      t(r + ): (9)
By (8), the prot-maximizing rate of investment is determined implicitly as a
function it = (t) with 0() = c00() 1 > 0. Substituting into (9) and dening
	(t)  c([t])   c0([t])(t) yields
 _  = f0(kt)   	(t)      t(r + ): (10)
Equations (6) and (10) dene a dynamical system in the two variables kt and
t. Letting 1, k1, and i1 denote steady state values, (6) and (10) imply that
i1  (1) =  (11)
f0(k1) = 	(1) +  + 1(r + ) (12)
which uniquely determine the steady state of the system.




















10from (6) and (10). These equations, together with the boundary conditions
k0 = K0 and limt!1t = 1 =  1(), provide two linear dierential equa-
tions which can be solved for the functions dt=d and dkt=d, i.e., for the
comparative-dynamic response of the system to a change in the local rate of
taxation on capital.11
In particular, assuming that the locality is initially in a steady-state equilib-
rium, (13) and (14) form a two-equation system with constant coecients. To
solve this system, it is convenient to reduce its dimensionality. Using (11) in (13)
and noting that 0(1) = 1=c00(), it follows that d_ k=d = (k1=c00())dt=d


















Noting (as is easily veried) that 	0(1) =  , substitution from (15) and (16)
















with the boundary conditions k0 = K0 and limt!1kt = k1. The characteristic










note that 1 > r and 2 < 0, where these inequalities depend on the concavity
of f and the convexity of c. Let 1  f0(k1)=(k1f00(k1)) denote the steady-
state value of the local elasticity of demand for capital. Then one can verify










From (20), it follows that
dkt
d
< 0 for all t > 0; (19)
that is, an increase in the local tax on capital reduces the capital stock at all
subsequent times. Indeed, the reduction in the capital stock is monotonic, and
11See Boadway (1979) for a comparative-dynamic tax analysis, in a closed-economy context,
using similar techniques. Hartman (1964, Theorem 3.1, pp. 95-96, provides the relevant results
on the dierentiation of the solution to a dierential equation with respect to a parameter.
11the magnitude of 2 determines the rate at which the capital stock falls to its
new, lower, steady-state value. The resemblance between (20) and its static
equivalent, (2), is remarkable; in particular, the two both depend critically
on the local elasticity of demand for capital and dier by the time-dependent
adjustment factor 1   e2t. Since this factor approaches 1 as t ! 1, the long-
run response of the capital stock to a tax increase is identical to that derived
in the static model.
Note from (18) that the rate of adjustment of the capital stock depends
critically on c00(), that is, the second derivative of the adjustment cost function.
If the adjustment cost function is only mildly convex, so that c00 is close to zero,
then j2j is large and the adjustment to the new steady state occurs very quickly.
If c00 is large, however, j2j is small, and the adjustment to the steady state is
slow.
The principal conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a perma-
nent unanticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-state
equilibrium capital stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for capital.
The capital stock falls monotonically to its new steady-state value at a rate
that depends positively on the convexity of the adjustment cost function. In
particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment is instantaneous.
3.2 The Welfare Analysis of Fiscal Policy with Imperfect
Capital Mobility
Having characterized the comparative-dynamic eects of local capital taxes on
the evolution of the capital stock, it is now possible to consider the welfare im-
plications of capital taxation. In particular, it is of greatest interest to examine
the eect of changes in  on the welfare of local residents, as represented by their
lifetime wealth Y . To facilitate the exposition, consider rst the case where local




































where the second and third equalities follow from (20). Note that while (50)
resembles (5) in some respects, it also diers from it signicantly.
To interpret (50), consider rst the case where  = 0, i.e., the locality initially
raises no taxes from capital. In this case, it is clear that dY=d > 0, that is,
it is optimal for the locality to impose a positive tax on capital. This is in
contrast to the analysis in the static case, culminating in (5), where, as was
noted, the optimal local tax rate is zero. The gain from local capital taxation,
12however, depends on the value of the speed of adjustment of the capital stock;
the larger the value of j2j, the smaller the gain from taxing capital. Indeed, in
the extreme case of linear adjustment costs, adjustment is instantaneous, and
the gain from local taxation of capital vanishes.
In view of (19), it is obvious that local welfare is maximized by choosing a
positive rate of taxation  on local capital such that dY=d = 0. In fact, one
can solve (implicitly) for the (locally) optimal rate of capital taxation, expressed







an inverse-elasticity type of formula in which the rate of adjustment of the
capital stock, 2, again gures prominently.
These results change in a signicant but straightforward fashion when local
residents own some portion of the rms within the jurisdiction, i.e., when  > 0.
In this case, it is necessary to add the term d=d to the expression in (50) in
order to capture the impact on local welfare from a change in the tax rate on
capital. Explicit calculation of d=d shows that the formula for the optimal








The noteworthy dierence between (20) and (200) is that local ownership of
rms reduces the optimal tax rate on capital. In particular, if local rms are
owned entirely by local residents, so that  = 1, the optimal tax rate on capital
is zero. More generally, the higher the share of local ownership in rms, the
lower the optimal tax rate. To summarize,
Proposition 2: The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital
is directly proportional to the share of foreign ownership of rms and inversely
proportional to the elasticity of demand for capital. It is inversely proportional
to the speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes in
the local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous,
the optimal local tax rate is zero.
This proposition is helpful in the proper interpretation of previous results
from atemporal models which abstract from the dynamics of adjustment. When
adjustment costs are negligible, there are no quasi-rents to extract from the
owners of local capital, and no incentive for local governments, acting in the
interests of their residents, to impose scal burdens on this capital. However, if
it is costly to adjust the local capital stock, the owners of this capital, when net
scal burdens are imposed on them, will not nd it in their interest to reduce
12See the Appendix for a brief presentation of this generalization as well as a sketch of some
of the derivations underlying other parts of the analysis.
13the capital stock immediately to a level at which it again earns a competitive
net rate of return. Rather, they will allow the capital stock to fall gradually
until it reaches its new steady-state value. During this transition, the net rate
of return is below the level that can be obtained on external markets, and the
local capital tax thus transfers quasi-rents from capital owners to local residents.
Thus, a small open locality, whose policies have no perceptible eect on the net
rate of return to capital on external markets, can nonetheless achieve some
redistribution at the expense of the owners of imperfectly mobile resources even
though, in the long run, the net rate of return on local capital must return
to that which can be obtained on external markets. The redistributive impact
of the local capital tax, however, is dependent on the amount of quasi-rents
available to be captured, which depends on the costs of adjustment. Previous
literature, which abstracts from adjustment costs, in eect assumes that the
capital stock is able to adjust to changes in local scal policies without delay.
Obviously, the use of local taxes on imperfectly mobile capital to capture
rents from the owners of that capital is only eective when the capital is owned
by rms that in turn are owned, at least in part, by non-residents. Otherwise,
the taxation of local capital only imposes a tax burden on local residents.13
Even if local residents enjoy the full benets of the revenue from the capital
tax, the imposition of such a tax leaves them worse o, on a net basis, because
of its allocative eects: it drives capital out of the local jurisdiction over time,
imposing what from the local perspective is a distortionary tax on an input
that is available at a xed price on the external market. As is well known
from the theory of optimal taris, such a policy is not in the interest of a small
open jurisdiction, in the absence of quasi-rents accruing to outsiders that can
compensate, and more than compensate, for the distortionary eect of the tax.
While it is true that a locality's residents can benet from taxing imperfectly-
mobile capital when rms are owned at least in part by non-residents, the reduc-
tion in the stock of local capital reduces the productivity of local labor, and the
steady-state level of wage income is reduced by the taxation of mobile capital.
Taxing imperfectly-mobile capital thus involves an intertemporal tradeo for
local residents: they can enjoy the benets of reduced taxes for local public ser-
vices, but gradually their wage income erodes, ultimately by an amount greater
than the tax savings that they obtain by taxing capital. The preceding analysis
has shown that the taxation of local capital is in their interest in present value
terms, when discounted at the market rate of return. However, if the eects of
local policy are discounted at a lower rate, this intertemporal tradeo becomes
less favorable. Indeed, if they are not discounted at all, so that policies are
judged only by their long-run eects, the local capital tax is necessarily harm-
13See Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) for an analysis of taxation in an open-economy setting in
which, as here, the extent of foreign ownership of local rms plays a critical role in determining
the optimal local tax structure. In contrast to the present analysis, Huizinga and Nielsen focus
on the tradeo between distortionary local taxes on savings or investment and distortions of
costless interjurisdictional capital ows in a two-period setting. Here, by contrast, the local
government has access to distortionless taxes on or transfers to local residents and, but for
the imperfect mobility of capital, would never impose a capital tax.
14ful to local residents, even if rms are entirely owned by outsiders, and thus
should be avoided. This is another way to interpret the ndings of previous
analyses: by ignoring the transitional dynamics of adjustment to local policies,
they have in eect focused on the long-run impacts of scal policy and, in doing
so, have concluded that localities, acting in the interests of their residents, will
not attempt to impose scal burdens on mobile factors of production.
4 Comparative Dynamics: Time-Varying (An-
ticipated) Local Tax Policy
The analysis in the preceding section has shown how the introduction of imper-
fect capital mobility, in the form of adjustment costs, leads to signicant changes
in the incentives for a locality to impose a tax on capital. The analysis of tax pol-
icy in a dynamic setting, however, naturally raises questions about how policies
might vary over time, about expectations, and about time consistency. Many
of these issues have been thoroughly discussed in previous literature, and do
not necessarily warrant detailed analysis here. However, as has been seen noted
above, the dierence between the results from the static analysis in Section 2.1
and those of Proposition 2 derive from the quasi-rents accruing to non-resident
owners of local capital that, in the short run, can be captured by local residents
through an unanticipated permanent increase in the local tax rate. Wouldn't
capital owners foresee their vulnerability and act to shield themselves from scal
exploitation in this manner?
There are indeed several ways in which the ability of a locality to extract
rents from outside owners of partially (or wholly) immobile resources may, in
practice, be limited. First, if ownership of these resources is transferable, they
may be sold by non-residents to residents, or never acquired by non-residents to
begin with. When  = 0, as shown by (20), the optimal local tax rate is zero.
This is because there are no rents to extract from outsiders, and therefore no
local benet that can oset the cost of distorting the local capital stock. Second,
non-resident owners might attempt to inuence the local policy-making process
so as to protect their quasi-rents. In principle, they would be willing to pay
up to the full amount of these rents in bribes, campaign contributions, or other
rent-preserving activities. If local policymakers are perfect rent extractors, then
the attempt to inuence the local political process will, in eect, absorb the
wealth of non-residents within the locality in much the same fashion as local
taxes. On the other hand, it is conceivable that inuence over the local political
process can be achieved by non-resident capital owners at very low cost. In
this case, the equilibrium local policy choice would involve a negligible net scal
burden on capital. A third restraint on the use of local taxation to extract rents
from non-resident capital owners is the anticipation by outside investors that
their capital will be subject to taxation in the future, leading them to remove
some or all of their capital from the locality before the local tax is actually
imposed.
15To explore this third possibility more formally, suppose, in contrast to the
model of Section 2, that all agents anticipate an increase in the local tax rate
at some date t1  0. Specically, the tax rate at time t is  for 0  t  t1 and
 + for t  t1. Note that the anticipation of the change in policy at time t1 is
equivalent, technically speaking, to the unanticipated announcement, at t = 0,
of a time-varying policy { specically, one that maintains the initial tax rate
until t = t1 and then jumps to a higher level thereafter. While the discussion in
the remainder of this section is limited to the case of a once-and-for-all change in
policy at a specied future date t1, it will be apparent that more complex time-
varying policies, with any number of changes at any specied points of time, can
be built up from combinations of this simple one-time jump. Thus the following
analysis provides the foundation for essentially arbitrary perturbations of policy
over time.
With this anticipated jump in the tax rate at a future date, rms must plan
their investments both before and after t1 in a prot-maximizing fashion. This
does not drastically change the conditions characterizing the solution to the
prot-maximization problem (P); in particular, the form of the current-value
Hamiltonian is unaected and the optimal choice of the control variable it must
still satisfy (8). A condition like (9) also continues to hold, but its form reects
the change in the tax rate at t1:




  _  = (f0(kt)   c(it) + (t   1)it      t)   t(r + ):
(90)
where t  0 for 0  t < t1 and t   for t > t1.
As before, (8) and (90) combine to yield
 _  = f0(kt)   	(t)      t   t(r + ): (100)
Conditions (6) and (100) dene a dynamical system in kt and t which depends
on the parameter . The unique steady state of this dynamical system is dened
by (11) and by
f0(k1) = 	(1) +  +  + 1(r + ): (120)




















This pair of linear dierential equations can be solved for the functions dt=d
and dkt=d.
16To do so, it is convenient to convert these rst-order linear dierential equa-
tions in two variables into a single second-order linear equation in dkt=d alone.
As before, it is assumed that the system is initially in a steady-state equilib-
rium, and that the policy perturbation is small, which amount to evaluating
















However, in contrast to the analysis of time-invariant tax policy presented in
the previous section, the right-hand-side of (170) is now piecewise continuous
and must be solved separately for the intervals 0  t  t1 and for t  t1,
resulting in two equations with four constants of integration. The solutions
to these equations must must satisfy the boundary conditions k0 = K0 and
limt!1t = 1 =  1(), as before, and, in addition, both the state and the
costate variables that solve the prot-maximization problem, kt and t, must
be continuous functions of time, providing four conditions to determine the
constants of integration.
























for t > t1 (2b00)
where 1 and 2, respectively the positive and negative roots of the characteristic

















Comparing (19) with (190), it is clear that the qualitative impact of an in-
crease in the local tax rate is the same, whether the tax increase is unanticipated
or anticipated: in both instances, higher taxes cause the capital stock to be lower
at every point in time. This means, of course, that the mere anticipation of a
tax increase is sucient to cause the capital stock to start shrinking right away,
even though the actual policy change may lie far in the future. However, and as
would be expected intuitively, the pre-implementation impact of an anticipated
policy change is more limited, the more distant in time the policy change is.14
Dierentiating (21) with respect to t1, one can see that more of the long-run
14From (2a00), a higher value of t1 implies a smaller change in kt for any given t < t1.
17adjustment will have been completed by the time that the higher tax rate takes
eect, the longer the time between the announcement of the policy change and
its implementation (i.e., the larger the value of t1). The long-run eects of the
tax increase are exactly the same regardless of whether or not the tax increase
is anticipated.15
Although the qualitative eects of anticipated policy changes are identical
to those of unanticipated ones, the two dier in degree. In particular, the rate
of decline of the capital stock in the pre-implementation stage of adjustment {
i.e., in the period 0  t  t1 { is slower than would be true if the policy were
implemented immediately. Thereafter, the process of adjustment continues,
eventually resulting in the same reduction in the steady-state level of capital as
would be true for the unanticipated policy change. To summarize,
Proposition 3: (a) Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a
permanent anticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-
state equilibrium capital stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for
capital. The capital stock falls monotonically to its new steady-state value at a
rate that depends positively on the convexity of the adjustment cost function.
In particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment is instantaneous.
(b) The anticipation of a tax increase causes the capital stock to begin falling
immediately. The more in advance the tax change is anticipated (or announced),
the more the capital stock will have adjusted by the time the tax increase takes
place.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 merely recapitulates the results stated in Proposi-
tion 1, thus emphasizing the qualitative similarity of the two cases. The second
part, which is unique to the analysis of anticipated changes, is very intuitive.
Convex adjustment costs imply that the capital stock adjusts gradually over
time. It makes sense, then, that the anticipation of a tax increase causes ad-
justment to begin right away, allowing a longer period of time for adjustment
to take place. The anticipation of a policy change, does not, however, aect the
desired long-run adjustment. Hence, the main eect of anticipation of a policy
change is to lengthen and slow down the adjustment process.
Equipped with these results, it is now possible to consider the welfare im-
plications of local tax policy when policy changes are anticipated. Intuitively,
one would expect that the gains from taxation, identied in Section 2, are di-
minished. To check this, it is necessary to calculate the eect of an anticipated
change in the local tax rate on the net income of local residents. The method
of analysis is the same as for the case of unanticipated policy changes. Detailed
15Note from (2b00) that only the last term in brackets depends on time, and that it ap-
proaches zero as time increases, thus insuring that the long-run behavior of the system is
identical both to the case of anticipated policy changes as discussed in Section 2.2 and to the













e rt1 + e 1t1   e rt1
i
: (500)
This expression is a generalization of (50), reducing to it when  = 0 and t1 = 0
{ i.e., in the case corresponding to (50) where the prots of rms accrue to non-
residents and where the change in tax policy is unanticipated. More generally,
it is clear from (500) that the potential gains from an increase in the local tax
rate are reduced, to the extent that local rms are owned by local residents,
as one might expect. Furthermore, since the terms on the right-hand-side of
(500) depend negatively on t1, it is clear that the anticipation of a tax increase
reduces whatever positive impact such a policy might have on local residents.
Indeed, setting the derivative in (500) equal to zero and solving for the optimal











This expression generalizes (200), reducing to it when t1 = 0, i.e., in the case,
corresponding to (200), where changes in local tax policy are unanticipated. This
expression shows that it is indeed optimal for local residents to impose a tax
on local capital, even when this policy is anticipated, and even when a portion
of the prots of local rms accrue to residents. However, (2000) shows that the
higher the value of t1, the lower the optimal local tax rate. In fact, as t1 ! 1,
the optimal local tax rate approaches zero.
These ndings can be summarized as
Proposition 4: (a) The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital
is directly proportional to the share of foreign ownership of rms and inversely
proportional to the elasticity of demand for capital. It is lower, the greater the
speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes in the
local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous, the
optimal local tax rate is zero.
(b) To the extent that an increase in the local tax rate is anticipated, the op-
timal local tax rate is reduced; the more in advance the tax change is anticipated
(or announced), the lower is the optimal local tax rate.
The rst part of this proposition is almost identical to Proposition 2. The
second part is quite intuitive in light of the ndings presented in Proposition 3:
since the anticipation of a tax increase causes an outow of capital to begin even
before the higher tax takes eect, and since this outow reduces the benets
to local residents from higher taxes, it makes sense that the optimal tax rate is
lower when the owners of local capital are not taken completely by surprise by
changes in local tax policy.
16These calculations are outlined in an Appendix.
19The formula for the optimal tax rate in (2000) lends itself to empirical esti-
mation, and it is of interest to present some illustrative calculations based on
it. Suppose, for example, that the local production technology is Cobb-Douglas
and that the share parameter for capital is .25; this implies an elasticity of
demand for local capital  =  1:33. Assume a real interest rate of r = :05.
The parameters 1 and 2 reect the adjustment-cost technology and would
presumably vary, depending on the specic jurisdiction and on the type of cap-
ital being analyzed. It is beyond the scope of the present analysis to estimate
these parameters. However, note from (20) and (2b00) that 2 is the proportion-
ate rate of decline of the local capital stock subsequent to the implementation
(whether anticipated or unanticipated) of a higher local tax. This means that
the half-life of the post-implementation adjustment process is T = ln(:5)=2.
Since 1 = r   2, it is a simple matter to determine the values of 1 and 2
that correspond to dierent assumptions about the post-implementation speed
of capital stock adjustment.
Table 1 presents calculations showing the optimal local tax rate for dierent
assumed values of critical parameters of the model. Each panel is based on a
dierent assumption about the degree to which any change in local tax policy
is anticipated, ranging from the assumption that any change in policy is a total
surprise (Case A) to the assumption that policy changes are foreseen 50 years in
advance (Case D). Dierent columns of each panel reect dierent assumptions
about the adjustment cost technology, as reected in the half-life of the adjust-
ment process, ranging from very rapid adjustment (a half-life of only 6 months)
to quite slow adjustment (a half-life of 20 years). Finally, dierent rows in each
panel correspond to dierent assumptions about the share of the prots of local
rms accruing to local residents.
Qualitatively, the results follow the expected patterns. For example, it is
not in the interest of local residents to impose any tax at all on local capital if
this capital is employed in rms that entirely locally-owned; in this case, there
are no rents to capture from non-residents and the capital tax merely harms
local residents by distorting the level of local investment. The more rapid the
response of the capital stock to changes in the local net return to capital, the
lower the optimal tax rate. With extremely rapid adjustment, the optimal local
tax rate is eectively nil, but if capital can only be adjusted slowly, and if
signicant amounts of capital are owned by non-residents, then substantially
higher rates of taxation may be called for. At least this is the case if the local
tax can be imposed without warning, as shown in the top panel. However, if
rms foresee the threat of local taxes well in advance, the optimal policy is to
impose only minimal burdens on local capital, even if it can adjust only slowly
to local policy changes.
Although the calculations in Table 1 are only illustrative, one can readily see
how the theoretical analysis culminating in (2000) lends itself to empirical appli-
cation. Estimates of critical parameters characterizing production technologies
(), cross-ownership of factors of production (), and speeds of adjustment (1,
2) are in some cases relatively readily available for dierent countries or other
geographic units. Speeds of adjustment for spatial reallocations of capital (or
20other factors of production, like labor) have not been the focus of much of
nearly as much empirical analysis, but, in principle at least, these can also be
determined empirically. For example, Decressin and Fatas (1995) have explic-
itly estimated the migration response to local labor demand shocks in regions
of comparable size (roughly corresponding to US states) in the US and in the
EU, and have found that the speed of response in Europe is approximately half
that for the US.17 It is easy to see, from (2000) or from Table 1, exactly what
implications these ndings have for the determination of optimal local scal
policy. More estimates of this nature for regions or jurisdictions of dierent
size within countries and at the international level, for labor (of dierent types)
and for capital (of dierent types), could be used, for example, to test whether
greater factor mobility does indeed constrain governments in using scal policy
to impose net burdens or oer net subsidies. Of course, it is necessary simul-
taneously to assess the degree of cross-ownership of factors of production, a
non-trivial task. As noted at the beginning of this section, the desire of gov-
ernments to capture quasi-rents from non-resident owners of imperfectly mobile
resources may discourage cross-ownership of such resources. It is often noted
(e.g., Baxter and Jermann (1997))that international cross-ownership of capital
is insucient to achieve full diversication of risks on nancial assets. An in-
triguing question is whether political-economy considerations (essentially, risk
of expropriation through scal or other policies) plays a role in explaining this
fact.18 One might anticipate that low degrees of factor mobility (the i's) would
be associated empirically with a high degree of local ownership (). These issues
warrant further theoretical and empirical investigation.
5 Conclusion
The preceding sections have presented an explicitly dynamic analysis of scal
competition built on a standard model of costly adjustment of the stock of a
factor of production. This analysis has shown how an endogenously-determined
level of factor mobility aects the response to changes in scal policy and how
this in turn alters the desirability of alternative policies. The results do not
represent a complete break with those obtained in static or atemporal analyses;
on the contrary, the results from the dynamic analysis emerge as direct gen-
eralizations of those derived within standard static models. Broadly speaking,
the analysis indicates that governments may have incentives to impose net scal
burdens on imperfectly-mobile factors of production, even though this is harm-
ful in the long run, because there are short-run rents that can be captured from
the non-resident owners of these factors. On balance, the short-run gains can
oset the long-run losses, at least for modest rates of net taxation. However,
17For an interesting recent analysis of labor migration between the US and Mexico, see
Robertson (2000), who nds that labor ows occur more rapidly between parts of Mexico
that border the US than is true for more interior locations of Mexico.
18See Wildasin and Wilson (1998) for a formal model that addresses the implications of
local rent-capture for risk pooling and welfare, as well as for references to related literature.
21the ability of a government to capture these rents depends in part on being able
to \surprise" non-resident owners of the imperfectly mobile resources, and the
magnitude of the rents themselves depend on the costliness of factor mobility.
How quickly capital or labor can ow from one real-world jurisdiction to
another is an empirical question. It is commonly argued, and it is no doubt
broadly true, that there are more impediments to international factor ows than
to ows within countries. Such impediments presumably reduce the volume of
factor ows observed in practice, and give rise to dierentials in rates of return
gross of the costs of factor relocation. They probably also tend to reduce the
speed of equilibrating factor market adjustments, although it must be noted
that this is not necessarily the case.19 The analysis developed above invites
empirical application and indicates exactly what sorts of empirical analysis are
likely to shed the greatest light on policy-relevant issues.
The theoretical analysis presented here is nonetheless quite simplied in a
number of respects, and a number of important extensions remain to be un-
dertaken. The analysis here has focused on the case of a jurisdiction that is
suciently small that its policies do not aect equilibrium factor prices in ex-
ternal markets. As in the theory of the rm in a perfectly competitive industry,
this obviates the need to be concerned with strategic interactions among gov-
ernments. If, however, two or more jurisdictions are suciently large relative to
external factor markets that their policies have non-negligible impacts on factor
prices, the choice of scal policy by one will aect the optimal choices of others,
and conversely. The analysis of strategic scal interactions in a dynamic setting
such as that presented above may oer useful new insights.
In focusing on optimal policy for a single jurisdiction, the analysis has not
explicitly addressed the welfare properties of scal competition among a system
of jurisdictions. It is apparent, however, that imperfect mobility of factors gives
rise to incentives for small governments to impose distortionary scal policies.
In a world where all jurisdictions are perfectly symmetric, the fact that each
imposes an identical net burden on a mobile resource causes no spatial factor
misallocations. However, in the more general and realistic case where jurisdic-
tions have diereing production or adjustment-cost technologies or dier in the
degree of local ownership of mobile resources, they will optimally impose un-
equal scal policies on imperfectly-mobile factors, resulting, in the equilibrium
of the entire system, in an inecient spatial allocation of resources. (This is
in contrast to the results obtained in the standard atemporal models with free
factor mobility, where, in equilibrium, no small jurisdiction would impose a non-
zero scal burden on mobile factors which are thus, in equilibrium, allocated
eciently over space.) An obvious topic for further investigation is whether and
how local policies can be constrained or coordinated (e.g., through restrictions
imposed by higher-level governments or through intergovernmental agreements)
so as to limit or eliminate these ineciencies.
19In the formal analysis above, the speed of adjustment is dictated not by the \level" of
adjustment costs but by the \convexity" of the adjustment cost function { i.e., its second
derivative. Knowing that adjustment costs are high is not equivalent to knowing that adjust-
ment takes place slowly.
22From the viewpoint of empirical applicability, one of the more serious limi-
tations of the above analysis is the fact that it is restricted to the case of a single
imperfectly-mobile factor of production. In many contexts, it is of considerable
interest to analyze the simultaneous dynamic adjustment of two or more factors
of production, such as labor and capital, dierent types of labor (e.g., skilled
and unskilled), or dierent types of capital (e.g., long-lived structures as com-
pared with short-lived equipment or inventories). The foregoing analysis can be
generalized almost immediately to the case where dierent industries within a
jurisdiction use dierent mobile factors of production in combination with dif-
ferent immobile factors, and where the dierent mobile factors can be subjected
to dierent scal treatment. In this case, each immobile factor can be analyzed
independently along the lines developed above. Such an analysis would show,
for example, that it is optimal to impose smaller scal burdens on those factors
of production for which the speed of adjustment or the degree of local ownership
is particularly high. While this case is perhaps not entirely without interest, it is
much more natural in many instances to view dierent imperfectly-mobile fac-
tors of production as complementary inputs in the local production process and,
at least in some instances, as likely to be subject to uniform scal treatment.
An explicit analysis of the joint stock-adjustment problem with complementary
inputs would shed light on the optimal structure of scal treatment for dierent
factors of production, an issue of considerable empirical and policy relevance.
23REFERENCES
Baxter, M. and U. Jermann (1997), \The International Diversication Puzzle
Is Worse Than You Think," American Economic Review 87 170{191.
Boadway, R. (1979), \Long-run Tax Incidence: A Comparative Dynamic
Approach," Review of Economic Studies 46, 505{511.
Bradford, D.F. (1978), \Factor Prices May Be Constant but Factor Returns
Are Not," Economics Letters 1, 199-203.
Cremer, H., V. Fourgeaud, M. Leite-Monteiro, M. Marchand, and P. Pestieau
(1996) \Mobility and Redistribution: A Survey," Public Finance 51, 325{352.
Decressin, J. and A. Fat as (1995), \Regional Labor Market Dynamics in
Europe," European Economic Review 39, 1627{1655.
Dwyer, T. (2000), \`Harmful' Tax Competition and the Future of Oshore
Financial Centres, Such as Vanuatu", Pacic Economic Bulletin 15.
Fuest, C. and B. Huber (1999), \Can Tax Coordination Work?", Finan-
zarchiv N.F. 56, 443{458.
Gould, J. P. (1968), \Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the
Firm", Review of Economic Studies 35, 47{56.
Hamermesh, D. S. and G. A. Pfann (1996), \Adjustment Costs in Factor
Demand," Journal of Economic Literature 34, 1264{1292.
Hartman, P. (1964) Ordinary Dierential Equations (New York: Wiley).
Hercowitz, Z. and D. Pines (1991) \Migration with Fiscal Externalities,"
Journal of Public Economics 46, 163-180.
Huizinga, H. and S. B. Nielsen (1997), \Capital Income and Prot Taxation
with Foreign Ownership of Firms," Journal of International Economics 42, 149{
165.
Jensen, R. and E. F. Toma (1991), \Debt in a Model of Tax Competition",
Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 371{392.
Lee, K. (1997), \Tax Competition with Imperfectly Mobile Capital", Journal
of Urban Economics 42, 222{242.
Mieszkowski, P. (1972), \The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Prots
Tax?" Journal of Public Economics 1, 73{96.
Musgrave, R. A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-
Hill).
Musgrave, R. A. (1971), \Economics of Fiscal Federalism," Nebraska Jour-
nal of Economics and Business, 3{13.
Oates, W.E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: New
York.
Oates, W.E. (1999), \An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic
Literature 37, 1120{1149.
24OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris:
OECD).
Robertson, R. (2000), \Wage Shocks and North American Labor Market
Integration," American Economic Review 90, 742{764.
Sinn, H.-W. (1997), \The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems
Competition," Journal of Public Economics 66, 247{274.
Sorensen, P. B. (forthcoming), \The Case for International Tax Coordination
Reconsidered," Economic Policy.
Stigler, G.J. (1957) \The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government,"
Joint Economic Committee, Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth
and Stability, reprinted in E.S. Phelps (ed.) Private Wants and Public Needs,
Rev. ed., 1965, (New York: Norton), 167-176.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956), \A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditure", Jour-
nal of Political Economy 64, 416{424.
Treadway, A. B. (1969), \On Rational Entrepreneurial Behaviour and the
Demand for Investment", Review of Economic Studies 36, 227{239.
Walz, U. and D. Wellisch (1996) \Strategic Provision of Local Public In-
puts for Oligopolistic Firms in the Presence of Endogenous Location Choice",
International Tax and Public Finance 3, 175{189.
Wellisch, D. (2000), Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Wildasin, D. (1998) \Factor Mobility and Redistributive Policy: Local and
International Perspectives," in P. B. Sorensen (ed.) Public Finance in a Chang-
ing World (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd.), 151{192.
Wildasin, D. (forthcoming) \Factor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in the EU:
Policy Issues and Analytical Approaches," Economic Policy.
Wildasin, D.E. and J.D. Wilson (1996) \Imperfect Mobility and Local Gov-
ernment Behavior in an Overlapping-Generations Model," Journal of Public
Economics 60(2), 177{198.
Wildasin, D.E. and J.D. Wilson (1998) \Risky Local Tax Bases: Risk-
Pooling vs. Rent Capture", Journal of Public Economics 69, 229{247.
Wilson, J. D. (1986) \A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition", Journal
of Urban Economics 19, 296{315.
Wilson, J.D. (1999) \Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal
52, 269{304.
Zodrow, G. and P. M. Mieszkowski (1986), \Pigou, Tiebout, Property Tax-
ation and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods" Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics .
25APPENDIX
This appendix spells out some additional details behind the results in the
text.
It is a straightforward matter to verify that equations (2a00) and (2b00) solve
(170), which implies, as a special case, that (20) solves (17). Propositions 1 and
3 follow easily once these solutions are obtained.
To calculate the eect of a change in  on local welfare, as measured by Y ,
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d






















































where the second equality is obtained by noting rst that k1dit=d = d_ kt=d
in a steady state and then by integrating by parts.
Dierentiation of (40) (see (50) for comparison), using (22) and (23),
dY
d


















It is easy to see from this expression why the term (1   ) appears in (200) and
(2000) and not in (20).
The remaining rather tedious task is to substitute for dkt=d from (2a00) and
(2b00) and to perform the relevant integrations in order to solve explicitly. The
details are omitted, but the interested reader will wish to note from (18) that
1   r =  2, which facilitates some cancellations and simplication.
26Table 1.  Optimal Local Tax Rate (in percent)
Case A: Unanticipated Policy Change
Local Ownership Half-life of Adjustment Process (in Years)
Share 0,5 1 2 5 10 20
0,00 2,7 5,4 10,8 27,1 54,2 100,0
0,25 2,0 4,1 8,1 20,3 40,7 81,4
0,50 1,4 2,7 5,4 13,6 27,1 54,2
0,75 0,7 1,4 2,7 6,8 13,6 27,1
1,00 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Case B: Tax Increase Anticipated by 1 Year
Local Ownership Half-life of Adjustment Process (in Years)
Share 0,5 1 2 5 10 20
0,00 0,7 2,6 7,4 22,6 48,3 99,9
0,25 0,5 2,0 5,5 16,9 36,2 74,9
0,50 0,3 1,3 3,7 11,3 24,1 49,9
0,75 0,2 0,7 1,8 5,6 12,1 25,0
1,00 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Case C: Tax Increase Anticipated by 5 Years
Local Ownership Half-life of Adjustment Process (in Years)
Share 0,5 1 2 5 10 20
0,00 0,0 0,2 1,7 11,5 31,7 74,2
0,25 0,0 0,1 1,3 8,6 23,7 55,6
0,50 0,0 0,1 0,9 5,7 15,8 37,1
0,75 0,0 0,0 0,4 2,9 7,9 18,5
1,00 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Case D: Tax Increase Anticipated by 50 Years
Local Ownership Half-life of Adjustment Process (in Years)
Share 0,5 1 2 5 10 20
0,00 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 8,8
0,25 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 6,6
0,50 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 4,4
0,75 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 2,2
1,00 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0